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Chapter Nine 
Stylized Facts and Policy Alternatives 
 
The main objective of this book has been to explain why so many parts of 
the developing world have failed to generate stable rates of growth in per capita 
incomes, and to offer policy alternatives for them to correct this outcome. The 
failure of growth was particularly widespread during the quarter of century or so 
after a series of adverse shocks beginning in the late 1970s. This period also 
coincided with a major shift in development policies toward an emphasis on 
market liberalization and a retreat from state intervention. History has not been 
kind to the mainstream interpretation of economic development and the policies 
associated with it. 
We set ourselves the task of analyzing in Chapters 2 to 5 the growth 
patterns of developing countries over the past several decades, based on a 
framework that emphasizes the role of economic structures set out in Chapter 1. 
On the basis of this evidence, we provided in Chapters 6 to 8 an alternative way 
to understanding financial structures, the macroeconomic dynamics of 
developing countries, and the challenges associated with the transformation of 
their production structures. 
This chapter presents eight main “stylized facts” that can be drawn from 
our empirical analysis and, on the basis of this evidence, summarizes and in 
some cases expands our major policy conclusions. We also offer a contrast 
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The first stylized fact that comes out from our analysis is that convergence 
in income levels among countries is the exception rather than the rule. This 
conclusion contrasts with the prediction of convergence – either in absolute or 
conditional form — that characterizes most orthodox models of economic growth. 
Indeed, divergent economic performance has been the major characteristic of the 
evolution of the income per capita between industrial and developing countries 
over the past two centuries. This phenomenon came back with force in the late 
1970s, giving rise to a “great divergence” in the incomes of industrial and 
developing countries that characterized the last two decades of the twentieth 
century. This was accompanied by very uneven growth among different 
developing countries, with the success stories of East and South Asia coinciding 
with the poor performance of most of the developing world. 
The late twentieth century divergence was associated with clustering of 
growth collapses (reduction in income per capita over several years), in sharp 
contrast to the clustering of success stories during both the post-war “golden 
age” and the recent 2003-2007 boom. The clustering in time of both successes 
and collapses underscores a second stylized fact:  international factors play a 
crucial role in the overall growth dynamics of the developing world. Again, this 
finding contrasts with the emphasis on domestic policies and institutions as the 
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basic determinant of economic growth that characterizes mainstream analysis 
and, in particular, its numerous massive cross country econometric exercises (in 
which, with a few exceptions, international conditions are entirely absent from the 
analysis).1 
The high frequency of developing country growth collapses during the lost 
decade of the 1980s was associated with the unusually large and in a sense 
unprecedented interest rates and terms of trade shocks that they faced, the 
effects of which lasted until the early 2000s. The recent boom must be 
understood, in turn, as the result of the end of the long-term effects of these 
adverse shocks, together with the positive linkages generated by the new 
engines of the world economy, particularly China. In the case of several low-
income countries, debt relief and increased aid also played a role. The rapid 
spread of the recent world financial crisis to the developing world in the second 
half of 2008 serves to reinforce this dependence of growth performance on 
international factors.  
The painful adjustment and frustrating growth during the late twentieth 
century were accompanied with the change in the overall policy environment 
towards the “Washington consensus” emphasis on market liberalization. Fast-
growing regions were less zealous about applying the liberalization philosophy, 
and performed better. Indeed, the clear success cases of the late twentieth 
century – various Tigers, China, Vietnam among other countries in Southeast 
Asia, and more recently India – are hardly paragons of neo-liberalism. They 
                                                 
1 See, for example, the well-known text of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003), where 
both the theoretical and the empirical literatures are summarized. 
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succeeded not because they followed but rather because they deviated from 
widespread market liberalization of their economies, maintaining, in particular, 
crucial instruments of macroeconomic and industrial policies. Some Central and 
Eastern European policy-makers think of themselves as neo-liberal but many 
vestiges of the old order, in the form of an industrial base and high levels of 
human capital, remain; their integration with the European Union was also a 
basic ingredient of their recovery from the transition crisis. 
 When looking at the domestic features of successful vs. slow-growing 
economies in the developing world, a third stylized fact emerges, perhaps the 
most central to the analysis of this book: structure matters. When making this 
assertion we rely on a large structuralist literature that, in different variants, goes 
back to Hollis Chenery and Raúl Prebisch, the two great intellectuals to whom 
this book is dedicated, as well as Karl Marx, Joseph Schumpeter, and Albert 
Hirschman, to mention just a few – authors, by the way, of quite different 
ideological inclinations. 
There is, again, a sharp contrast between this framework and most 
mainstream analyses, where production and trade structures are viewed as a 
passive outcome rather than an essential determinant of economic growth. There 
are exceptions to this rule, including leading developing economists critical of the 
Washington consensus (particularly Rodrik, 2007), the neo-Schumpeterian 
growth literature (see in particular Aghion and Howitt, 1998), and trade 
economists who have analyzed the implications of specialization patterns for 
growth, and emphasize the diverse technological learning paths that characterize 
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different economic activities (see, for example, Krugman, 1987; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1995). Our views share several of the analytical conclusions of these 
authors. 
A large part of our analysis has precisely focused on figuring out just how 
and why structure matters. In the empirical decompositions of change in 
production structures, we saw that fast growing economies are characterized by 
strong output and labor share shifts accompanied by sustained productivity 
growth, with strong reallocation effects in some cases. In contrast, in the less 
successful regions there was either scant structural change or deindustrialization 
combined with an increase in the share of informal, low-productivity services. 
The analysis of trade structures likewise revealed that developing 
countries specialized in exports with high-technology contents tend to do better, 
and those specialized in natural resourced-based exports tend to perform poorly. 
A similar story applies to trade in services. Successful economies, such as India, 
have specialized in dynamic services that contribute significantly to overall 
productivity growth and high skilled employment. In several other regions, 
tourism represented a dynamic service activity but lacked these productivity links. 
 This analysis carries an implicit message: intelligent sector-level policies 
can facilitate the development process. To an extent, structural change can be 
planned or, at least, induced. 
This analysis sheds light on the determinants of productivity growth. 
Stated goals of the liberalization package were to enhance labor productivity and 
employment growth. Outside the consistently expanding economies, this did not 
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happen. Productivity movements across sectors differed in detail in the slow-
growing and stagnant regions but, in general, did not add up to very much. Also, 
overall, liberalization did not help create jobs – industrial jobs in particular. 
Rather, it increased underemployment, which was absorbed most frequently in 
informal service activities and, in a few cases, in agriculture. The associated fall 
in productivity, which is quite common in the service sector in low-growth 
economies, indicates that poor productivity performance was more an effect than 
a cause of poor GDP growth. 
This leads to a fourth stylized fact: productivity growth is as much a result  
as a cause  of economic growth, largely because demand matters not only for 
short but also for long-term growth. This point is generally missed in most 
mainstream analyses of growth, which are essentially supply driven. The reason 
is that they assume full employment of available resources and the lack of any 
Verdoorn-Kaldor effects (or Arrow’s “learning by doing”) in which production itself 
leads to productivity improvement. 
The first of these factors is important, because the existence of a “reserve 
army or the underemployed” is a crucial structural feature of developing 
countries. Successful long-term economic performance is associated with the 
gradual absorption of the reserve army into the modern sector of the economy, 
whereas poor growth performance leads to the engrossing of the reserve army. 
The first linkage leads to an increase in overall productivity; the second to a 
reduction. Trying to understand these phenomena as some sort of “productivity 
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shocks” simply misses the point emphasized above: that productivity is both 
caused by and causes GDP performance. 
The interaction of underemployment and Kaldor-Verdoorn effects is crucial 
to understand the growth dynamics in developing countries. Even in purely 
supply-driven models, they give rise to the results predicted by classical 
development economists: possible low-growth traps and rapid growth as labor is 
dynamically allocated towards the modern sector (Ros, 2000). More importantly 
for the analysis in this book, they generate a possible interaction between GDP 
and productivity growth in which growth is demand-led. The relevant demand 
factor may be investment demand, as in the Keynesian growth models 
associated with Nicholas Kaldor and Joan Robinson. In developing countries, the 
most relevant factor may be an externally-generated demand boom, in which 
favorable export and/or external financing conditions play the key role, amplified 
by their induced effects on domestic investment and consumption. 
At a sectoral level, the dynamic economies of scale generated by the 
Kaldor-Verdoorn effects and by learning by doing are important in another sense: 
because they determine links between past and future patterns of specialization. 
Whether an economy is able to move towards higher value added economic 
activities depends on the accumulation of technological capabilities, largely as a 
result of previous production experience. So, the capacity of the East Asian 
economies rapidly to transform their specialization patterns has been associated 
to their capacity to accumulate technological capabilities. But also, as we saw, 
the productive capacities built into Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the 
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semi-industrialized economies during the era of more active state intervention 
gave them the possibility of diversifying their exports into mid-tech manufactures 
in the more open domestic and global environment of the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries. 
 According to our empirical analysis, supply factors do not have the 
explanatory role assumed in the mainstream literature and, therefore, do not 
seem to have played the leading role in the success stories. There is a clear 
association between capital stock and output growth rates across all regions, but 
here the supply-side interpretation is not compelling. The association can be 
better explained by rapid capital stock growth contributing to labor productivity 
growth and driving output growth from the side of demand with savings adjusting 
endogenously, rather than by higher savings leading to more capital which feeds 
into output via some sort of aggregate production function. 
In turn, the other supply links generated by either human capital 
accumulation and opening economies to foreign direct investment are at best 
weak. Better nutrition, education and health have an intrinsic value: they are 
human rights and merit goods. They may also play a more indirect role, as a 
“framework condition” for successful growth, but they do not seem to be a 
determinant of the varying performance of different developing countries or of 
changes in their momentum of economic growth through time (Ocampo, 2005). 
 A supply-side interpretation is more appropriate for the changes in (fossil 
fuel) energy/labor ratios. The key policy question that arises is whether in the 
near future rich country energy/labor ratios can be reduced (or energy 
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productivity increased relative to labor productivity) substantially by technological 
innovation and social rearrangements. If such innovations work out, then perhaps 
they can be passed to developing economies before the momentum of their 
population growth overwhelms all possibilities for combating global warming. 
If there is a supply factor that plays a central role in developing country 
macroeconomic dynamics, it is foreign exchange availability rather than 
production capacity. This leads to a fifth stylized fact: external shocks, both 
positive and negative, crucially influence the macroeconomic dynamics of 
developing countries. Although related to the second stylized fact mentioned 
above, this fact focuses on short-term GDP variations rather than on long-term 
growth dynamics. Counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies are key to coping 
with massive external shocks, not only to smooth the domestic impact of external 
demand fluctuations but also to prevent important macroeconomic prices – the 
exchange and interest rates, in particular — from deviating from their 
developmental objectives. 
Avoiding exchange rate overvaluation during booms is crucial to support 
the structural transformation of the economies towards new export and import-
competing sectors with higher technological content, and for export and 
production diversification in general. In turn, maintaining growth during externally-
induced crises requires both avoiding high interest rates and managing the 
foreign exchange constraint (the “external gap”) faced by developing countries 
during these periods. Stability in both exchange and interest rates is also 
fundamental to facilitate rapid capital accumulation. 
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Regrettably, pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies have become the rule 
rather than the exception in the developing world. Pro-cyclical policy responses 
multiply the impacts of external shocks. The net result has been exchange rate 
appreciation and inflationary pressures during booms and severe recessions or 
outright growth collapses during crises. Liberalization policies may have helped 
to reduce inflationary pressures but have clearly worsened pro-cyclical 
responses through capital account and financial liberalization and their general 
disregard for the developmental objectives of exchange rate management. 
Our sixth stylized fact is that the dynamics of sectoral net borrowing 
patterns strongly influence possibilities for macroeconomic management, but the 
dominant patterns are not those usually underscored in orthodox analyses. Fiscal 
austerity packages implemented in many countries in the 1980s and the 1990s 
were supposed to lead to improvement in external balances along IMF financial 
programming lines. That clearly was not the common outcome. More typical were 
mirrored up and down co-movements of private balances and external borrowing. 
Financial deregulation and capital account liberalization strengthened this 
correlation, and were followed by financial crises in many countries, sometimes 
more than once. They help explain the erratic performances in several regions. 
Private and government balances sometimes moved in opposite directions, but 
this correlation has little to do with Ricardian equivalence and more with what the 
literature on binding external constraints predicts – including its traumatic 
manifestations in the face of foreign exchange scarcity, which includes inflation 
taxes and forced savings. 
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 Macroeconomic flexibility, although difficult to define and even harder to 
attain, is certainly important. According to the analysis of sectoral gaps, the major 
task of counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies relates to the management of 
swings in private sector balances in the face of unstable external financing. 
Structural conditions also matter here, in several ways. First, the character 
of developing countries as “risky borrowers” in international financial markets 
generates pro-cyclical variations in the availability of external finance and in 
“parity interest rates” (discussed in detail below) that are very hard to manage,, 
particularly when the capital account is fully liberalized. Also, some forms of trade 
specialization are more prone to macroeconomic shocks. In this regard, as we 
have seen, specialization in natural resource-based exports is more cyclically 
vulnerable than in manufacturing, and that in mid-tech manufactures (some of 
which have acquired commodity characteristics) is more cyclically prone than 
specialization in low or high-tech manufactures. 
Additionally, financial development plays a crucial role in both enhancing 
macroeconomic flexibility but also generates risks of its own. This can be 
considered, indeed, as a seventh stylized fact. Financial development does 
increase the tools available for countries to manage boom-bust cycles. But it also 
generates the possibility of financial instability, which can have different 
characteristics, depending on the nature of the financial system. Prudential 
regulation and the diversity of financial intermediaries are critical to provide 
stability to the system. 
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The previous seven lead to an eighth and final stylized fact: success in the 
developing world is associated with States as much as markets. States are 
responsible in particular for inducing a favorable structural transformation of the 
economy and for managing positive and negative external shocks. And, in both 
cases, the “policy space” provided by the international environment and 
international rule making is crucial. One of the most troublesome features of the 
more liberalized international and domestic environments that have prevailed in 
recent decades is that the “policy space” of developing countries has significantly 
shrunk. 
After the failure of liberalization policies in inducing rapid growth in the 
developing world, a new sort of consensus has been developing in recent years 
that recognizes more explicitly the role of the State. Some of the elements of this 
new consensus are welcome, particularly its emphasis on social policy and 
infrastructure. The adverse effects of “pro-cyclical” macroeconomic policies are 
also increasingly being recognized. Indeed, the term “counter-cyclical” 
macroeconomic policies, long absent or mentioned only as a secondary issue in 
the mainstream literature, has made a strong comeback. But several of the active 
structural and macroeconomic policies that we emphasize in this book are still 
disregarded by the mainstream analysis. And the obsession with property rights 
has made the mainstream institutional literature “one dimensional”, and 
incapable of understanding the positive links between State intervention and 
market success that underlies successful development experiences, in the 
industrial and developing world alike. 
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 Policy Alternatives 
Myriad policy recommendations that are derived from our attempt to 
incorporate these stylized facts into our analytical framework are found 
throughout the book, particularly in Chapters 6 to 8. In this section we 
recapitulate and in some cases expand on alternatives which should fit the 
characteristics of today’s developing countries. 
The core idea is that the success can be reproduced by other countries 
around the world if the policy agenda promotes changes in production and trade 
structures towards higher productivity sectors and utilization of idle resources, 
while at the same time it advances the development of financial structures and 
the adoption of counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies to manage both positive 
and negative external shocks. The “policy space” to adopt development and 
macroeconomic policies coherent with these objectives is crucial, as is overall 
policy coherence, particularly the coherence between short term macroeconomic 
management and developmental goals. 
Patterns of transformation will not be necessarily the same everywhere. 
The level of development and, particularly the degree of diversification of 
production and trade structures already achieved, the accumulated technological 
capabilities, the natural resource endowments and the size of the economies are 
one set of structural factors relevant for choices in the area of production sector 
policies. The extent of financial development and the degree of integration into 
global financial markets are another set that will determine macroeconomic policy 
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alternatives. More generally, the application of our framework must always be 
context-specific, as it must take into account the specific structural features of a 
country and the international environment at a point in time. The mainstream 
search for “one size fits all” solutions that was so typical of Washington 
consensus policies is simply wrong. To have any chance for success, policy has 
to be tailored to each country’s conditions and constraints. 
 
Macroeconomic Policies 
In the macroeconomic area the two crucial issues that we have 
underscored are the need to enhance financial development and to design 
appropriate counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies. There are others which we 
have not analyzed but are also crucial. Most important among them is the need 
to have an adequate and progressive tax base to facilitate the adequate 
provision of social services and social protection as well as infrastructure 
development. 
Financial development implies, first, the development of a sound banking 
sector and domestic bond markets. In the latter area, central bank and 
government bonds are commonly the starting point, but the final objective should 
be the development of deep corporate bond markets that facilitate investment 
financing. When long-term funds for investment financing are not available, 
public sector or state-sponsored development banks can play a very important 
role. They continue to be important when commercial banks and corporate bond 
markets provide financing with only limited maturity. Development banks and 
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state intervention in general can also play a role in increasing access to finance 
by agents that are have limited access to financial markets, including small firms 
and poor households, particularly in the latter case for financing their major 
asset, housing. 
Interestingly, state intervention is quite extensive in many of these areas 
even under highly sophisticated financial markets (for example, in the United 
States). The development of bond markets, stock markets, and other advanced 
forms of financing – such as sound securitized mortgages and sound derivative 
markets — may require the promotion of specific institutional investors, which 
operate as “market makers.” Development banks, insurance firms, and pension 
funds play a role in these areas in many countries; specific state-sponsored 
agents do the same even in industrial countries (for example, in the case of the 
US mortgage market). 
The possibility of financial instability is present at all stages of financial 
development. Financial development has a dual effect in this area. On the one 
hand, a denser institutional network of financial agents can be stabilizing and 
broaden the room of maneuver for counter-cyclical monetary policy. At the same 
time, however, new risks are created. They include maturity mismatches 
between investment requirements and available finance, currency mismatches 
when external liabilities are used to finance the acquisition of domestic assets 
(particularly those producing non-tradable goods and services), excess leverage 
(the multiplication of financial liabilities relative to the capital base on which 
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financial institutions operate), and even the sheer development of unsound 
financial instruments.  
These risks are present in all financial system as reflected, for instance, in 
the importance of the latter two in the recent financial crisis in the industrial 
countries, including collateralized debt obligations based on subprime mortgages 
and credit default swaps backed by very small capital bases. The first two sorts 
of risk are particularly important in developing countries, where variable mixes of 
maturity and currency mismatches are inherent to balance sheet structures. 
Financial regulations must therefore become increasingly sophisticated as 
financial markets develop. Regulatory shortfalls are behind the high frequency of 
financial crises that have plagued the industrial and developing countries since 
the 1970s. Avoiding excess leverage and thus guaranteeing an adequate capital 
base in the financial system, as well as adequate provisions (or reserves) to 
cover expected losses is the most basic issue. Almost equally important in 
developing countries is the management of maturity and currency mismatches. 
The simplest regulatory options are strict provisions or coverage for risk of 
balance sheets that have such mismatches, or quantitative limitations or even 
outright prohibitions on foreign currency borrowing by domestic agents that 
produce non-tradable goods and services. And it should never be forgotten that 
over the centuries newly invented but unsound financial instruments have 
sparked many crises. 
Finance is inherently pro-cyclical. Risks are accumulated during booms 
that are only evident at the end, when it is generally found that financial systems 
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are seriously under-capitalized relative to the risks they have assumed. This 
recurring outcome lies behind a basic recommendation put forward in Chapter 7: 
prudential regulations should have a strong counter-cyclical component. One of 
the major problems behind current regulations is that they are actually pro-
cyclical, including pro-cyclical pattern of credit ratings; the broad use of mark-to-
market pricing, which fits transparency criteria but tends to transmit assets boom-
bust cycles to portfolios; risk evaluation models that, due to their similar design, 
may actually turn markets more volatile; and, more broadly, the tendency to build 
excessive leverage and open speculative positions during booms. The simple 
recommendations are to increase capital and/or provisions for loan losses during 
booms, and to avoid mark-to-market asset pricing from feeding into leverage – by 
(for example) imposing limits during booms on the values of assets that can be 
used as a backing for credit or bond issues. 
Pro-cyclical finance also calls forth counter-cyclical macroeconomic 
policies. The problem here is that the pro-cyclical availability of external financing 
limits the space available to developing countries to adopt counter-cyclical 
policies. Fiscal policies can always play a role, for example through progressive 
income taxes that would operate as an automatic stabilizer by increasing 
government revenues at a faster pace than overall economic activity during 
booms or temporary tax hikes during these phase of the business cycle, the 
design of permanent safety nets to support the vulnerable during crises, fiscal 
stabilization funds to “store” windfall revenues during upswings, and rules that 
target “structural” fiscal balances – i.e., a deficit adjusted by pro-cyclical swings in 
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tax revenues and the costs of safety nets used as automatic stabilizers during 
crises. In practice, however, the application of these principles is difficult, largely 
because political pressures lead governments to spend during booms, 
particularly when they were forced to cut spending during the preceding crisis as 
part of orthodox stabilization packages. Thus, pro-cyclical fiscal policies are 
unfortunately a common pattern in the developing world – a trend that must 
certainly be reversed. 
An even more problematic feature is the tendency of parity interest rates 
(the costs of external financing, including country risk spreads, plus expected 
depreciation, or minus expected appreciation, of the exchange rate) to fall during 
booms and increase during crises. If countries follow these trends, monetary 
policies will be pro-cyclical and exacerbate swings in output. But trying to 
increase interest rates during booms and reduce them during crisis, going 
against trends in parity rates, may simply worsen exchange rate instability. 
Indeed, higher rates during booms increases incentives to bring in more capital, 
reinforcing appreciation trends. Lower rates in a crisis can generate incentives to 
take capital out, thus enhancing exchange rate depreciation and the risks of 
recession or even a long period of foreign exchange scarcity if the economy has 
failed to diversify during the boom 
This sort of interaction is the true dilemma of monetary and exchange rate 
policies in open economies. Inflation targeting, the ruling paradigm of monetary 
policy, can provide a framework for counter-cyclical policies when domestic 
demand is the sole determinant of domestic prices. But its counter-cyclical effect 
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is unclear when exchange rates are a major determinant of domestic prices and, 
in any case, by failing to set exchange rate or balance of payments objectives, it 
may result in excessive exchange rate fluctuations. As a short run solution, 
exchange rate appreciation during booms will shift any excess demand towards 
the balance of payments. Although the inflation target may be met, the increase 
in the current account deficit and associated appreciation will become an element 
of vulnerability to a sudden stop in external financing. As a long term solution, 
this choice entirely ignores the developmental dimensions of the exchange rate –
i.e., the links between the exchange rate and the diversification of the productive 
and trade structures. 
Both from a short as well as a long-term perspective, macroeconomic 
policies in developing countries should therefore include an element of 
“exchange rate targeting” (Frenkel and Taylor, 2007; Frenkel, 2007). The 
massive interventions in foreign exchange markets in developing countries in 
recent years means that this is also a “revealed preference” of economic 
authorities in many if not most countries. 
The main contributions of macroeconomic policies to long term growth are 
moderate and relatively stable long-term real interest rates, and competitive and 
relatively stable real exchange rates. The first can facilitate investment financing. 
The second can contribute to structural change in the production and trade 
structures. The exchange rate becomes more important as the trade regime is 
liberalized because protection and export subsidies become less readily 
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available to promote structural change. (This effect of trade liberalization has 
often been ignored.)  
We have argued in this book that it is possible for macroeconomic 
authorities to set, within limits, both interest and exchange rates.  In practice this 
freedom of maneuver may depend on a mix of capital account regulations and 
(possibly massive) interventions in the foreign exchange market. It is a rewarding 
exercise, as empirical evidence indicates that exchange rate competitiveness 
has positive effects on economic growth in developing countries – or, what is a 
similar result, that a strong current account has positive effects, not only on short 
term but also on long-term growth. 
 
Structural Transformation Policies 
The major task of structural transformation policies is to facilitate a 
dynamic restructuring of production and trade towards activities with higher 
technological content. We argued that countries that have industrialized have, in 
a broad sense, always pursued industrial policies, a statement that applies 
historically to the United States and Great Britain as well as to Japan and the 
East Asian Tigers, among others. Industrial interventions have included trade 
policies (tariff and non-tariff protection, and export subsidies) and tax incentives, 
but also “pro-trust” policies to help create national champions and the active 
utilization of military spending with industrialist objectives. The more aggressive 
East Asian policy in the post-Second World War period is, furthermore, 
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consistent with Gerschenkron’s (1962) insight that active state intervention tends 
to be more important for late comers and, we could add, for late-late comers. 
The Washington consensus hit hard at these instruments and proposed 
that trade liberalization would be a less distortive and more powerful instrument 
of development. This proved to be wrong. As we have extensively argued in this 
book, trade liberalization has not been the instrument used by most of the 
successful developing economies, which have actively promoted the 
diversification of their production and exports towards sectors with higher 
technological content. 
An appropriate integration into the world economy can, of course, be a 
powerful instrument of development policy. This concept has indeed always been 
at the heart of structuralist thinking. After all, according to the views of 
structuralists, the main objective of industrial policies was always to change the 
form of insertion of national economies into the global economic system – that is, 
to redefine the international division of labor, not to return to any form of “autarky” 
(a  concept that is, in any case, irrelevant to understanding modern 
development). The real question is then what are the instruments that developing 
countries can use to promote a better insertion into the world economy today. 
In this regard, trade instruments are less readily available than in the past, 
except for low income countries, and intellectual property provisions are more 
stringent. A major instrument that has not been limited by international 
agreements is development banking. In many successful experiences, state-
supported banks have been a major channel for financing new developmental  
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activities, mixed in several cases with some ingredient of state ownership. Some 
countries continue to use this mix, most notably China. In today’s developing 
countries, government-backed long-term lending should be mixed with the 
encouragement of corporate debt markets, an activity that itself can be supported 
by development banks as “market makers”. 
Several criteria have been discussed on how to design industrial policies 
today (see, for example, Ocampo, 2005; Rodrik, 2007, ch. 4; World Bank, 2005, 
ch. 5). As proposed in Chapter 8, the objective of these policies should always be 
the promotion of patterns of structural change that lead to the accumulation of 
technological capabilities. On the basis of the ongoing debate, several criteria 
can be proposed. 
The major one can be formulated in a straightforward way: policies should 
promote innovative activities that generate positive domestic spillovers. The 
concept of “innovative activities” should be understood in a broad sense, to refer 
not only to new technologies, but also new markets, new industrial structures, or 
exploitation of previously underutilized natural resources. In today’s export-
oriented developing countries, export diversification, in either products or 
markets, should certainly be a major objective. In all cases, we should 
emphasize that “innovation” is what is “new” for the country or region where it 
takes place, regardless of whether this activity is fully developed elsewhere. 
Domestic spillovers – production linkages and technological externalities – are 
critical to justify government action, as benefits should go beyond the firm that 
undertakes the innovation. 
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Implicit in the emphasis on spillovers is that state intervention should aim 
at higher “value added”, either in terms of technological content or at least of 
domestic contents. Indeed, the latter follows from the fact that GDP is nothing 
else but value added. So, promoting pure assembly manufacturing or tourism 
with limited domestic contents is not desirable per se, unless that opens the 
space for further innovations down the line. It is perhaps paradoxical, as Rodrik 
(2007, ch. 4) has emphasized, that the major forms of “industrial policy” in recent 
decades have been the promotion of free trade zones and the attraction of direct 
foreign investment through tax breaks or full tax exemptions – that is, activities 
that tend to reduce rather than increase domestic linkages and value added. 
In turn, the emphasis on “activities” rather than “sectors” raises a series of 
important questions. One is whether it is possible to separate an activity from the 
sector where it predominantly occurs. A particularly important case in this regard 
is whether it is possible to separate the process of promoting production from 
that of building technological capacities. The implicit assumption of old forms of 
industrial policy interventions was that the accumulation of technological 
capacities was closely tied to –in a sense, a by-product of— the development of 
particular sectors. Promoting increasingly sophisticated industrial sectors was, 
therefore, the way to both promote innovation and the accumulation of 
technological capacities. Technological advancement per se became a passive 
rather than an active process. 
In today’s world the issue of whether to promote activities rather than 
sectors turns out to be a pragmatic question, of whether it is possible to de-link 
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the innovative activity from the innovative sector. There is no single answer. But 
what is clear is that, whether a specific activity or a sector is promoted, and 
whether the “innovation” does not directly lie in the area of production (e.g., 
conquering new markets or exploiting new resources), what is essential is that 
the final goal is the accumulation of technological capabilities.  
The emphasis on activities carries another message: as opposed to what 
was usually accepted in the past, sectors other than manufacturing also offer 
opportunities for innovation. They include modern services but also primary 
production, both in niche high value added products (e.g., fresh fruits and 
vegetables) and also the technological upgrading of other natural resource 
intensive activities.  
This basic criterion applies at each stage of development, though in 
different ways, and opens possibilities of active policies for all countries. How to 
increase productivity in basic agricultural activities should be the starting point of 
any development policy in low-income countries. How to move from primary 
goods to resource based and low skilled manufactures and services will be the 
challenge for low and low-middle income countries, while middle income 
countries increasingly confront the choice of moving to manufactures and 
services with higher  technological content. . For those producing resource based 
goods or mid-tech manufactures subject to strong cyclical swings, an important 
element of the strategy must be how to diversify towards less cycliclyvulnerable 
export sectors, and to accompany structural strategies with strong counter-
cyclical macro policies. 
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Structural transformation involves a public-private partnership of some 
kind. The need for such a partnership is associated with the information problems 
that different agents face: better information of the private sector on production 
processes and specific markets, but better information of the State on the 
economy as a whole, on international conditions and processes and, of course, 
its capacity to enforce rules that benefit the whole of the private sector rather 
than individual agents. The nature of the partnership will vary from country to 
country, depending on the characteristics of both private agents and the state. In 
all cases it should be understood as a mutual learning process. 
The incentives that are designed may be horizontal (that is, an incentive 
that applies to a certain activity in all sectors) or selective. A preference for 
horizontal incentives may be correct in some cases, but they may be inadequate 
to promote the special activities that generate the strongest spillovers and 
associated accumulation of technological capabilities. When fiscal resources are 
involved, how to allocate them is always a selective decision and it is better to 
adopt it on the basis of an explicit strategy. 
Selective strategy is not just or even mainly about “picking winners” – the 
typical motto used by critics of industrial policies. Any success will involve a 
learning process, concentrating on what should be promoted and drawing 
lessons from making wrong choices. Individual firms in a free trade environment 
confront exactly the same the same problems. 
. The worst choice is for the State to assume that the task of designing 
appropriate structural development strategies is impossible and therefore to take 
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a passive stance. Its appropriate strategy may be characterized as “discovering” 
or even “making winners” in close interaction with production sector firms. This 
emphasis follows from our basic framework of analysis, according to productivity 
increases are, to a large extent, the result of production experience.  
The decision making process was no doubt simpler during the import 
substitution era, when it was based on what was imported and the size of 
domestic markets. For some export oriented economies, looking at the export 
structures of countries with higher incomes may be appropriate. But, as 
industrializing economies (now South Korea, Taiwan, and in some aspects 
China) approach the world technological frontier, hands-on administrative 
guidance of the old style may not work (Woo, 2007). However, even if the 
bureaucracy cannot foresee ”the next big thing” in information or other new 
technology-oriented sectors, it can certainly help finance research and 
development, and provide long-term finance to firms and the infrastructure 
backup in these sectors – as in South Korea’s 90+% broadband internet 
coverage. None of these policy areas is restricted by international agreements, 
and these types of policies are actively practiced by states in industrialized 
countries today. 
Incentives should be matched by performance standards – “reciprocal 
control mechanisms”, to use Amsden’s (2003) terminology. They should be 
granted on a temporary basis and dynamically adjusted to move forward in the 
structural transformation process. But any a priori definition of the duration of 
incentives may turn out to be artificial and could lead to the loss of resources 
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invested without the policy objectives being met. A much better solution may be 
designing a learning process that would lead to decisions about whether to 
dismantle failed policies or extend successful policies until when they bear their 
full fruits. 
Finally, all of this requires investing in institution building. The destruction 
of institutional capacity to pursue developmental policy area was devastating in 
most of the developing world under the Washington consensus. But nothing 
indicates that it cannot be rebuilt. Indeed, mainstream analysis usually carries a  
contradictory view regarding institution building. It is usually assumed that 
creating good central banks or tax authorities is within the reach of developing 
countries, but that promotion of productive sector development is somehow 
impossible. There is no reason why. Successful countries have shown that it can 
be done. 
 
International Environment   
 Although the focus of this book has been on domestic macroeconomic 
policies and structural development strategies, the international environment is 
critical, as clearly indicated by the clustering in time of successes and failures 
across a broad range of countries. So, designing better instruments for global 
macroeconomic policy management is essential for developing countries, as is 
their adequate voice and participation in the associated decision making. 
Finally, and once again, international rule making should leave enough 
“policy space” for developing countries to adopt strategies and policies to 
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manage external shocks and promote their structural transformation. This is an 
area where there has been a clear regression in recent decades. A more 
equitable world is certainly not a world based on rules that make development 
more difficult. 
